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Abstract 
This paper proposes a novel approach to determine whether mutual funds time the market. 
The proposed approach builds on a heterogeneous agent model, where investors switch 
between cash and stocks depending on a certain switching rule. This represents a more 
flexible, intuitive, and parsimonious approach. The traditional market timing models are 
essentially a special case of our model with contemporaneous switching rule. Applying this 
model to a sample of 400 US equity mutual funds, we find that 41.5% of the funds in our 
sample have negative market timing skills and only 3.25% positive skills. 20% of funds apply 
a forward-looking approach in deciding on market timing, and 13.75% a backward looking 
approach. We also note that market timing differs considerably over fund styles. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Given the number of mutual funds and the wealth invested with them, it is of little surprise 
that the performance and ability of mutual funds has been a source of considerable research. 
One strand of this research has focused on the market timing ability of fund managers. Market 
timing involves fund managers predicting the future direction of the market, and on the basis 
of that forecast adjusting the market exposure of the fund accordingly. Market timing ability 
is a justification for the existence of actively managed funds, as the fund manager’s ability to 
time the market should provide extra returns that exceed the fees incurred from active 
management.  
 
While market timing ability has received considerable attention, there is an ongoing debate on 
the correct approach to evaluate the market timing ability of fund managers; see, for example, 
Aragon and Ferson (2008) for a comprehensive overview of the literature on measuring 
portfolio performance. The best known approach was introduced by Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) who argued that successful timers would increase exposure to the market when market 
returns are expected to be high and reduce exposure when market returns are expected to be 
low. This change in exposure would result in a convex relationship between fund and market 
risk premium, and can be captured by running a regression that includes a quadratic term for 
the market return. The idea of a convex relationship has been built on by a number of studies. 
However, significant concerns have been expressed about the use of return-based models. For 
example, Jagannathan and Korajcyzk (1986) argue that dynamic trading strategies may induce 
convexity even when no market timing exists. Furthermore, as certain stocks have option like 
features it is possible to find convexity in passive funds where no attempts at market timing 
are made. In addition, Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ivkovich (2000) show that the timing ability 
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of managers is biased downwards when timing is measured at a monthly frequency but 
engage in market timing on a daily basis. Different approaches have been employed to control 
for these biases.  
 
Based on the return-based measures discussed above, two approaches have been employed to 
correct for the weaknesses in the models. Bollen and Busse (2001) and Busse (1999) use daily 
fund returns rather than the more commonly used monthly returns to study market timing. 
Using daily data, Bollen and Busse (2001) show a marked increase in evidence of market 
timing ability, both positive market timing and negative market timing (34% vs 11% for daily 
and monthly, respectively). Hence Bollen and Busse (2001) suggest that future studies need to 
focus on daily rather than monthly data. In another line of research, Chen and Knez (1996) 
and Ferson and Schadt (1996) argue that one of the problems has been the use of 
unconditional performance measures, and that conditioning on public information results in a 
more accurate evaluation of the ability of managers. Specifically, Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
show that after conditioning on public information much of the negative timing ability 
observed in funds disappears or becomes insignificant.
2
  
 
In this paper, we introduce an alternative approach to time variation in market exposure by 
combining the market timing literature with the heterogeneous agent approach to switching. 
This novel approach takes into account both lines of research mentioned above. The 
heterogeneous agent literature in finance, as reviewed in Hommes (2006), describes how asset 
price dynamics can be explained by heterogeneous investors who apply time-varying 
investment strategies. Investors are heterogeneous in the sense that they have different types 
                                                 
2
An alternate approach to the return-based measure has been employed by Jiang, Yao and Yu (2005). This study 
employs portfolio fund holding information to calculate a fund beta based on the weighted average of the betas 
of the individual stocks held. The timing measure is then calculated as the covariance between the fund beta and 
the return on the market. Jiang et al. (2005) show that this measure results in a reduction in funds with negative 
timing ability with most funds showing insignificant but positive timing ability.  
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of expectations concerning the future price of a risky asset, based on differences in 
interpretation of the available information. Typically, the agents, or investors, are assumed to 
either have a momentum expectation or a mean reversion expectation. Investors are then 
modelled to switch between different investment strategies based on the recent performance 
of these strategies (see Brock and Hommes, 1997, 1998). Hence, investors are assumed to 
apply a positive feedback strategy. The market price is subsequently assumed to be a time-
varying weighted average of the two groups of agents. As a result, the behavior of the market 
as a whole is time-varying, providing an explanation for the momentum and mean reversion 
anomalies, excess volatility, volatility clustering, and excess kurtosis. A number of papers 
have illustrated the empirical validity of such an approach. Boswijk, Hommes, and Manzan 
(2006) estimte a heterogeneous agent model for the S&P500 and find significance of 
momentum and mean reversion, and switching between them. De Jong, Verschoor, and 
Zwinkels (2010) show similar results for the foreign exchange market, and Frijns, Lehnert, 
and Zwinkels (2010) for the options market.  
 
Typically, the heterogeneous agent approach attempts to explain market dynamics by means 
of the time variying nature of expectations of investors. We generalize the heterogeneous 
agent approach by turning this relationship around; we explain the behavior of investors by 
studying the time-varying nature of their exposure to the market. We do this by allowing 
mutual funds to switch between the risk free rate and the market conditional on the expected 
excess market return. Whereas the heterogeneous agent literature has typically focused on 
describing market returns by modelling investor behavior, we take an opposite approach and 
attempt to explain mutual funds’ returns by studying the time variation of their exposure to 
the market. This approach has some important advantages over the typical methods. 
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The market timing literature, as described above, has typically focused on deducing whether 
funds actually attempt to time the market and whether they are succesful at it. We take an 
important additional step by not only showing whether funds attempt to time the market, but 
also which information is used to take this decision. The multinomial switching function, as 
first proposed by Manski and McFadden (1981), represents a deterministic approach to time-
varying coefficients. It is flexible enough to allow us to condition the time variation in market 
exposure of mutual funds on any information available, such as the set of public information 
as suggested by Ferson and Schadt (1996). In addition, it allows us to vary the investment 
horizon of investors. It is not unreasonable to assume that funds take a few days to decide 
before adjusting their market exposure. When conditioning switching exclusively on 
contemporaneous market returns, the model essentially reduces to the standard approach with 
squared market returns. Furthermore, our model is rather parsimonious as it only consumes 
one additional degree of freedom relative to the standard linear model, regardless of the 
amount of conditioning information added. This is especially in contrast to the conditional 
market-timing methods described in Aragon and Ferson (2008). 
 
In the empirical application, we first show how the traditional market timing model is a 
special case of our more flexible, intuitive, and parsimonious switching model.  Results reveal 
that there is indeed a large overlap between the model, but that our switching model is able to 
filter out more market timing behavior. The results indicate that 41.5% of the funds in our 
sample have negative market timing skills and only 3.25% positive.  Subsequently, we present 
two examples of alternative conditioning variables that might be used to decide on switching. 
Our results show substantial cross-sectional variation in the behavior of mutual fund 
managers. Out of all 400 mutual funds in our sample, 20% of funds apply a forward-looking 
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approach in deciding on market timing in that future returns are positively predictive for 
market exposure, and 13.75% apply a backward looking approach.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy 
to uncover the market timing skills of mutual fund managers. Section 3 discusses the data and 
Section 4 the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Market Timing Strategies 
 
To examine whether mutual fund managers apply market timing strategies and how, we 
propose the following model. In a market timing strategy, a fund manager increases or 
decreases the fund’s exposure to the market depending on her/his expectation of the market’s 
performance. We assume that, unconditionally, a fund will have a certain position in risk-free 
securities and risky assets, represented by the market, i.e., 
 
itmtiiftiit rrr εβδδα ++−+= )1( ,     (1) 
 
where rit and rmt are the raw returns of fund i and the market at time t, respectively, βi 
measures the level of market risk of the mutual fund, and iδ  measures the proportion of 
capital held in risky assets. Since proportions need to stay between a range of 0 and 1, we 
restrict iδ  between zero and one.
3
 Given the fact that mutual funds are typically restricted to 
                                                 
3
As a consequence, Equation (1) cannot be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), but needs to be estimated 
by constrained maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), where these restrictions can be imposed. Alternatively, 
one could resort to constrained OLS estimation, also known as the Kuhn-Tucker Estimator (see e.g. Gourieroux 
et al., 1982). However, as our full model needs to be estimated by MLE, we also resort to this model for our 
benchmark.   
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long-only strategies, it comes natural that an increase in the exposure to the risky asset, i.e., an 
increase in iδ , goes at the expense of exposure to the risk-free asset. This effect is 
unaccounted for in the typical market timing model. We estimate this model over the whole 
sample period, where we can consider the obtained coefficients as the unconditional market 
exposure. This serves as a benchmark when modeling conditional market exposure.  
 
If the specific mutual fund follows an active market timing strategy, then we expect the 
proportion of capital allocated to risky securities to vary over time. Hence, in the conditional 
version of Equation (1), the fund manager will increase exposures to the market and to cash 
depending on her or his expectations of whether risk-free or risky assets will outperform, 
 
itmtiitftitit rrr εβδδα ++−+= )1( ,    (2) 
 
where δit is the time-varying proportion of money allocated to risky assets. This allocation is 
given by 
 
iitit w δδ = ,        (3) 
 
where wit is the weight of risky assets and iδ  is the unconditional allocation of money to risky 
assets.  
 
Weights, wit, are determined by a multinomial choice function (see Manski and McFadden, 
1981) where switching occurs on the basis of expected relative profitability, i.e. 
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where Ctπ and
S
tπ are expected performance measures of cash and stocks, respectively. By 
construction, wit  is bounded between zero and one. 
 
The sensitivity of fund managers to the difference in performance is given by γ,  the so-called  
intensity of choice parameter. A positive (negative) γ implies that wit, increases (decreases) 
whenever the expected profitability of stocks increases relative to the expected profitability of 
cash. The absolute magnitude of γ measures the responsiveness of fund managers. With γ = 0, 
managers do not react to performance differences and is therefore passive when it comes to 
market timing. As γ increases (in absolute terms), fund managers become more aggressive in 
shifting capital between cash and stocks. In the extreme case where ∞→γ , managers are 
either fully exposed to cash or fully exposed to the risky asset, conditional on infinitesimal 
small differences in expected performance. As such, 1/γ can be interpreted as a measure of 
status quo bias, as introduced in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982). Status quo bias 
refers to the bias in human decision making which states that individuals have a tendency to 
hold on to the status quo. In our particular case, it refers to fund managers sticking to their 
unconditional risk exposure even though they expect one of the assets to perform better in the 
future. 
 
The expected profitability measures Ctπ  and 
S
tπ  can have many functional forms and can 
include information from many sources, exogenous or endogenous, that (potentially) cause 
the fund manager to adjust the composition his portfolio. In this case, and in line with 
previous literature, we assume that the amount of capital allocated to stocks or kept in cash 
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depends on the expected relative performance of stocks or cash. However, we acknowledge 
that fund managers do not want to deviate too much from their unconditional benchmark, and 
moderate the expected profits from additional holdings in either stocks or cash by the 
deviations from the unconditional holdings. We express the profit function in the following 
way, 
 
( )iit
jtj
it
S
δδ
π
−
=
−1exp
,       (5)  
 
where j stands for either cash or stocks, Sjt is the expected return of either holding cash or 
investing in risky assets, and jitπ  is the expected profitability measure for that particular 
strategy
4
. Hence, if a fund manager expects stocks (cash) to generate a higher return and the 
current exposure to stocks (cash) does not yet deviate too far from the unconditional exposure, 
she or he will increase the exposure to stocks (cash). 
 
Given that a fund manager has an incentive to maximize assets under management, we 
assume that allocation occurs on the basis of expected returns.
5
 A subsequent question is how 
expectations on future returns are formed. The approach is flexible enough to use any type of 
information, but here we test for three different configurations, representing three different 
degrees of complexity. The first setup uses contemporaneous returns, jtjt rS = ; that is, the 
exposure to the market is a function of period t returns. This setup is essentially equivalent to 
the standard market timing methodology using the squared market return. The second setup 
assumes that portfolio managers act as positive feedback traders, 1−= jtjt rS ; i.e., expected 
                                                 
4
We use the exponent in the denominator to ensure that we cannot divide by zero.  
5
Returns of the fund obviously cause assets under management directly, but also indirectly by attracting capital 
inflows; see Sirri and Tufano (1998). 
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returns are assumed to be a function of period t - 1 returns. The final setup assumes perfect 
foresight 1+= jtjt rS , where period t+1 returns are inserted in the profit function (5). 
 
To measure the presence of market timing conditional in any of the three configurations, we 
focus on the sign and significance of γ. A positive (negative) and significant value for γ would 
indicate that the fund managers perceives the conditioning information in π as a positive 
(negative) signal for future returns and adjusts exposure accordingly. Since both positive and 
negative market timing has been observed in the past, we have no expectations regarding the 
sign and size.  
 
 
3. Data  
 
We collect fund return data from TrimTabs Data Services. We collect this data on a 
daily basis, as suggested by Bollen and Busse (2001), from the earliest point available, 2 
Feburary 1998 until 31 December 2004. Since we focus on market timing ability we remove 
any fund whose focus is not on US domestic equities. We further remove any balanced or 
hybrid funds and focus only on all equity funds for the US (we only include funds in the ICI 
categories 0 (aggressive growth), 1 (growth), 2 (growth and income), and 17 (equity income). 
This results in a sample of 400 mutual funds including live and dead funds. Both the risk free 
rate and the market return are extracted from K.R. French’s Tuck MBA School of Business 
online data library. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the mutual fund returns, risk 
free rate and market rate 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Baseline results 
We start by estimating a traditional model for market timing as a benchmark to investigate the 
presence of market timing (see Treynor and Mazuy, 1966), i.e. 
 
itftmtftmtftit rrrrrr εββα +−+−+=−
2
21 )()( .   (6) 
 
The test for the presence of market timing centers on the sign and significance of β2. If β2 is 
positive and significant, this implies that fund managers increase their market exposure when 
the market is going up, therefore providing evidence for successful market timing. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In Table 2, we report summary statistics for this regression. First, we note that α is on average 
negative at a value of 3.86% p.a., suggesting that the mutual funds in our sample, on average, 
underperform the market. Of the 400 funds we observe a significantly negative α for 89 funds, 
with only 16 producing significant positive α’s. In terms of market risk (β1), we find that, on 
average, funds track the market; the average β1 is 0.969 and all β1 are positive. There is, 
however, quite some variation in β1, ranging from a minimum of 0.332 to a maximum of 
1.750. When focusing on the market timing term β2, we find that the average coefficient is 
negative. This suggests that, on average, there is negative market timing behavior; the 
exposure to the market is decreased when the market performs well. Looking at the 
percentiles of the distribution, we observe that β2 is negative for most of the distribution. In 68 
out of 400 cases we find that β2 is significantly negative and thus significant evidence of fund 
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manager timing the market the wrong way around. In only one case we find significant 
evidence of positive market timing. These finding are in line with previous literature that has 
also reported negative market timing ability. Studies such as Kon (1983), Chang and 
Lewellen (1984), Henriksson (1984) and Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) all find the 
majority of funds are unable to time, while those that can time are more likely to be perverse 
timers, as also suggested by Carhart (1997). 
 
In Table 3, we report the results of our market timing model based on the switching driven by 
profit functions using contemporaneous returns. Broadly, these results are in line with the 
results presented in Table 2. Firstly, we observe that α’s on average are negative with a value 
of 4.65% p.a.; a slightly larger underperformance than for the traditional market timing 
model. Second, when we look at iδ , the unconditional proportion of capital invested in risky 
assets, we observe that, on average 93.1% of capital is allocated to risky assets. As a result, on 
average 6.9% of capital is kept in cash. There is some variation in this proportion, where the 
minimum investment is 50.8% and the maximum is, by definition, 100%. The results for the 
β’s are the same as for the traditional market timing model. This suggests that what we 
capture with our market timing model is indeed very closely related to the traditional 
approach. When looking at the switching (market timing) coefficient γ, we find that it is, on 
average, negative. This implies that fund managers seem to switch away from the most 
profitable strategy, or stated differently, time the market the wrong way around. This is 
similar to the findings using the traditional switching approach. As with the traditional 
approach, we also find that the switching parameter is negative over most of the distribution 
of the funds. We further find that in 166 out of 401 cases there is evidence of negative 
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switching and in 13 cases there is evidence for positive/correct market timing.
6
 Hence, our 
market timing model based on switching reveals more evidence of active timing strategies 
than the traditional model, both positive and negative.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
To determine whether there is a relationship between the market timing implied by our model 
and the traditional market timing model, we present a scatter plot in Figure 1 where we plot 
the market timing coefficient of the traditional model β2 on the x-axis versus the switching 
parameter γ on the y-axis.  
 
The scatter plot reveals the close relationship between the two approaches, suggesting that 
this configuration of our model indeed captures a similar type of behavior as the traditional 
market timing model. An interesting observation is the somewhat concave shape of the 
relationship; in the lower left quadrant the values for γ are clearly lower than would be the 
case for a linear relationship. This is explained by the nonlinear functional form of the 
switching function (4); the marginal effect of a change in γ decreases as γ gets larger (in 
absolute sense). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
As an alternative check we compute correlations between traditional and switching-based 
market timing and report these in Table 4. We observe that the correlation between the two 
                                                 
6
We cannot conduct simple t-test on this coefficient, as 1. we obtain parameter from a constrained MLE and 2. 
standard t-test often turn out insignificant in these models as the switching parameter γ enters the model 
nonlinearly. We therefore perform a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test with two degrees of freedom that compares the 
performance of Equation (2) (the model with timing) with the performance of Equation (1) (the model without 
timing). A significant increase in model fit suggests significant evidence of market timing.   
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coefficients, β2 and γ, is very strong at almost 0.93. Secondly, we also look at the significance 
of switching implied by the traditional model and our approach. Again, the correlation 
between these two is very strong at a value of 0.75.  
 
4.2 Close-up: Morgan Stanley’s Utilities B 
To study the similarities and differences between the traditional market timing approach and 
our switching approach, we take a closer look at one fund, namely Morgan Stanley’s Utilities 
B, which is an equity income fund. We have chosen this particular fund because it yields 
significant results for both the market timing and the switching models; otherwise it is a 
random choice.  
 
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics of the time series of total market exposures for the 
market timing and switching models. For the former, total market exposure is given 
by mtr21 2ββ +  and for the latter by iitiw βδ, . In terms of mean and median, the two are very 
similar. The correlation between the two measures is close to one. The market timing 
approach, though, yields a far more volatile market exposure given the double standard 
deviation and minimum – maximum range. This suggests that the traditional approach implies 
more aggressive switching between cash and stocks.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a number of characteristics of the time-varying market exposures. The top 
two figures display the time series of total market exposure for the two models. The two 
series show a similar pattern, with high volatility in the first part of the sample, and lower 
volatility in the second part. The average exposure is comparable. Again, it becomes apparent 
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that the market timing model yields more volatile exposures, i.e. more aggressive switching, 
than the heterogeneous agents model.  
 
The bottom left plot shows the sensitivity of the two models to excess returns. The line for the 
switching model is somewhat less noisy than the other. This is caused by the fact that market 
timing in the switching model is based on excess returns, while it is based on absolute returns 
in the traditional market timing model. For both models, the estimation results pointed 
towards negative switching; i.e., market exposure is lower when excess returns are higher. 
This is clearly illustrated in the bottom left panel. The switching model is less sensitive to 
excess returns given the somewhat flatter line.  
 
The bottom right panel, finally, illustrates the close relation between our switching model and 
the traditional approach. The scatter plot of the market exposures yields a straight line. The 
range on the vertical axis, though, is smaller than the range on the horizontal axis. 
 
4.3 Forward Looking and Backward Looking Timing 
The results using the contemporaneous returns as expected returns in the profit function in 
Table 3 have shown that the traditional approach to market timing is essentially a special case 
of our heterogeneous agents-inspired switching mechanism. To illustrate the flexibility of the 
model, we subsequently study whether mutual funds managers apply forward or backward 
looking expectations in deciding on whether to change their fund’s exposure to the risky 
asset. To be more specific, we run the switching model using lagged and lead returns as 
decision variables in the profit functions jitπ . As indicated before, the model is flexible enough 
to include any decision variable. Here, though, we choose to examine lead and lagged returns 
as there is a clear economic intuition behind these variables. Expectations based on lagged 
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returns signal adaptive expectations while lead returns signal rational expectations. The 
estimation results are given in Table 6. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Table 6 presents the cross-sectional distribution of the switching parameter γ obtained from 
the model using lagged and lead returns in the profit functions. Regarding the lagged returns; 
while the average γ was negative using the contemporaneous returns as decision variable, the 
average γ is positive when using the backward looking returns. In other words, on average 
mutual funds increase their exposure to the market when previous day’s return are positive 
and when next day’s return are positive. In 55 cases, we find a significantly positive γ for the 
timing lag; hence, 55 funds significantly increase their exposure to the market in period t after 
a positive market premium in period t-1, such that they behave like positive feedback traders. 
45 funds are negative feedback traders, that is, they decrease their exposure to the market 
following positive excess market returns. Apparently, these fund managers believe in mean 
reversion and apply a contrarian strategy.  
 
Concerning the timing lead, the average γ is again positive. We find that 80 funds 
significantly increase their exposure to the market in anticipation of positive excess market 
returns; they therefore appear to have perfect foresight. This may suggest that there are fund 
manager that do time the market in a correct way, but do not do this contemporaneously as 
tested in many studies before, but by increasing their market exposure on the day prior to 
positive market returns. This could be a result of the daily frequency; adjusting exposure on a 
daily basis might be too costly. Interestingly, 41 funds behave exactly opposite and decrease 
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their exposure in reaction to a positive future return. It is hard to rationalize how this can be a 
deliberate strategy. 
 
4.4 Behavior across Fund Types 
As a final test, we study whether we observe differences in market timing for different styles 
of funds. Here, we split the sample of 400 domestic equity funds into the three ICI 
classifications aggressive growth (0), growth (1), growth and income (2), and equity income 
(17). Table 7 shows the results.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Focusing on the traditional market timing model first, we observe that the aggressive growth 
funds are the most active in trying to time the market; over 25% of the funds. Note, however, 
that they all time negatively. The growth funds are clearly the least active (10%) and the 
growth and income and equity income funds are comparable with 16% and 13%.  
 
Results for the switching model, spread over the three forecasting rules, gives a more detailed 
image of the behavior. As for the overall results, we observe more significant timing when 
applying our switching model for all styles. Clearly, though, the funds in the different classes 
do not behave similarly. The equity income funds are most actively in switching based on 
time t returns; 60% of the funds use that strategy, but all negatively. The least active group is 
again the growth funds, with 37%. Interestingly, the group of growth funds is the most active 
in switching based on lagged returns; in other words, the growth funds show the most 
evidence of feedback trading. For both the growth & income funds and the equity income 
funds we find a proportion of 31% that uses a forward looking strategy. Overall, we find that 
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close to 50% of the funds in the sample apply a market-timing strategy based on our 
switching model. This percentage is equally split in forward looking funds and backward 
looking funds. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we propose a new approach to measure the market timing ability of mutual fund 
managers. The proposed approach builds on the heterogeneous agent literature, in which 
agents are allowed to switch between certain trading rules. The switching between these rules 
is driven by the relative performance of the different strategies. In this case, we assume that 
fund managers can switch between holding cash and stocks, depending on which asset type 
they think will outperform the market. Compared with the traditional market timing approach 
of Treynor and Mazuy (1966), our model is more flexible, in the sense that switching can be 
driven by many or even multiple factors. Furthermore, it gives a richer economic 
interpretation and is more parsimonious than, for example, the conditional market timing 
models.  
 
We empirically implement our model to a sample of 400 US equity mutual funds, and use 
different rules for the switching between cash and stocks; a contemporaneous switching rule, 
which is equivalent to the traditional model of Treynor and Mazuy (1966); a forward-looking 
rule (assuming perfect foresight of fund managers); and a backward-looking used to examine 
whether fund managers behave as feedback traders. We find that 41.5% of the funds in our 
sample have negative market timing skills and only 3.25% positive skills. 20% of funds apply 
a forward-looking approach in deciding on market timing, and 13.75% a backward looking 
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approach. We also note that market timing activity and ability differs considerably over fund 
styles. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
#obs mean stdev min max skew kurt 
Percentiles 
1% 92 -0.0943 0.3991 -67.9893 1.05774 -17.8984 -0.2252 
5% 221 -0.0413 0.6396 -32.8572 1.9415 -5.0290 -0.0766 
25% 605 -0.0124 1.0602 -15.5723 4.5704 -1.1575 1.1012 
50% 983 0.0042 1.2530 -7.7363 5.6318 -0.2025 3.2370 
75% 1733 0.0278 1.5123 -4.1772 7.4668 0.0509 18.0077 
95% 1733 0.0925 2.0427 -2.0160 18.2732 0.2915 115.2984 
99% 1733 0.1106 2.6988 -1.5865 25.8158 0.5819 467.4528 
RF 1733 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0841 -1.6283 
RM 1733 0.0264 1.2487 -6.6260 5.3170 0.0157 2.1005 
Notes: Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the returns of the 400 mutual funds in our sample, the risk free 
rate RF and the market return RM. The percentiles represent the cross-section of funds. 
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Table 2 Traditional Market Timing 
α β1 β2 
Mean  -3.86% 0.969 -0.861 
Standard Dev 8.47% 0.240 1.269 
Min -55.54% 0.332 -5.165 
Max 16.80% 1.750 2.620 
Skewness -0.591 0.070 -0.489 
Kurtosis 6.752 2.836 4.011 
Significant + 16 400 1 
Significant - 89 0 68 
 
Percentiles  
5% -16.25% 0.576 -3.359 
25% -8.93% 0.797 -1.478 
50% -4.47% 0.959 -0.746 
75% 1.21% 1.135 -0.085 
95% 10.13% 1.344 1.147 
Notes: Table 2 presents the distributional statistics of the estimated coefficients of the traditional market timing 
model given by Equation (6). ‘Significant +’ and ‘Significant –‘ represent the number of significantly positive 
and negative coefficients out of a total of 400. 
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Table 3 Switching Model 
α δ  β γ 
Mean -4.65% 0.931 0.969 -3.261 
Standard Dev 8.73% 0.124 0.240 4.529 
Min -56.12% 0.508 0.332 -28.385 
Max 18.01% 1.000 1.750 6.823 
Skewness -0.519 -1.756 0.068 -1.207 
Kurtosis 6.209 4.915 2.842 6.392 
  
LR +   13 
LR-   166 
  
Percentiles   
5% -17.58% 0.639 0.576 -10.872 
25% -9.89% 0.909 0.799 -5.389 
50% -5.02% 1.000 0.961 -2.790 
75% 0.80% 1.000 1.132 -0.277 
95% 10.29% 1.000 1.344 3.011 
Notes: Table 3 presents the distributional statistics of the switching model with contemporaneous returns given 
by Equations (2) – (5). ‘LR +’ and ‘LR –‘ represent the number of funds out of 400 for which we find a 
significantly positive and significantly negative value for γ. 
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Table 4 Correlations 
 Switching  LR Switch 
Market Timing 0.926 T-Market Timing 0.752 
Notes: Table 4 presents the correlation between the market timing coefficients β2 and γ (left hand side) and the 
correlation between the significance of these coefficients (right hand side). 
 
 
 
Table 5 Conditional Market Exposures 
Market timing Switching 
 Mean 0.6882 0.6889 
 Median 0.6857 0.6877 
 Maximum 0.9810 0.8279 
 Minimum 0.2871 0.4952 
 Std. Dev. 0.0873 0.0418 
 Skewness -0.2974 -0.2700 
 Kurtosis 4.8860 4.8217 
   
Market timing 1.0000 
 
Switching 0.9995 1.0000 
Notes: Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the conditional market exposures of the traditional market 
timing model and out switching model. The former is given by β1+2 β2Rm and the latter is given by iitw βδ . 
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Table 6 Forward and Backward Looking 
Timing Lag Timing Lead 
Mean  1.196 1.421 
Standard Dev 5.978 6.649 
Min -23.125 -37.469 
Max 26.886 45.062 
Skewness 0.771 0.894 
Kurtosis 6.256 12.925 
 
  
LR + 55 80 
LR- 45 41 
 
  
Percentiles   
5% -6.849 -6.801 
25% -2.265 -1.877 
50% 0.297 0.410 
75% 3.759 4.674 
95% 11.799 11.087 
Notes: Table 6 presents the distributional statistics of the switching parameter γ for the case of backward looking 
expectations (Timing Lag) and forward looking expectations (Timing Lead). ‘LR +’ and ‘LR –‘ represent the 
number of funds out of 400 for which we find a positive or negative significant γ. 
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Table 7 Investment Styles 
Numbers Percentages 
Traditional  Switching Traditional  Switching 
Timing  Cont. Lag Lead Timing  Cont. Lag Lead 
Aggressive Growth (0)   
 + 0  5 19 20 0.00%  3.60% 13.67% 14.39% 
 - 35  71 13 21 25.18%  51.08% 9.35% 15.11% 
Growth (1)   
 + 1  9 24 22 0.72%  6.52% 17.39% 15.94% 
 - 13  43 27 19 9.42%  31.16% 19.57% 13.77% 
Growth & Income (2)    
 + 0  0 12 31 0.00%  0.00% 11.88% 30.69% 
 - 17  42 8 5 16.83%  41.58% 7.92% 4.95% 
Equity Income (17)    
 + 0  0 2 7 0.00%  0.00% 9.09% 31.82% 
 - 3  13 1 0 13.64%  59.09% 4.55% 0.00% 
TOTAL   
 + 1  14 57 80 0.25%  3.50% 14.25% 20.00% 
 - 68  169 49 45 17.00%  42.25% 12.25% 11.25% 
Notes: Table 7 presents the number of funds for which we find significant results over all specifications of the 
model split out over the four different investment styles.  
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Figure 1 Traditional versus Switching Market Timing 
 
Notes: Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of the 400 estimated β2 from the traditional market timing model 
(horizontal axis) and γ from the switcing model (vertical axis). 
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Figure 2 Conditional Exposures 
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Notes: Figure 2 compares the conditional market exposure implied from the traditional market timing model 
with that of the switching model. The upper two plots represent time-series of the conditional exposures. The 
lower-left plot gives the relation between the excess market return (horizontal axis) and the conditional market 
exposure (vertical axis). The lower right plot gives the relation between the conditional exposure of the market 
timing model (horizontal axis) and the switching model (vertical axis).  
